

# **A Common Vision for the Common Defense: Toward a More Comprehensive National Security Strategy**

**A Monograph  
by  
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SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

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## ABSTRACT

**A COMMON VISION FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE: TOWARD A MORE COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY** by MAJ Kemp L. Chester, USA, 46 pages.

The current *National Security Strategy* is supposed to be the means by which the Nation expresses its fundamental national security goals, identifies national interests, and matches these interests with the necessary tools to implement the strategy on a daily basis around the world. However, the current national security strategy contains critical shortcomings. Its articulation of national objectives and interests is too broad to be truly meaningful. It prescribes a single strategy of Selective Engagement for the entire world, ignoring the possibility that that particular strategy may be appropriate for some regions but wholly counter-productive for others. In addition, by failing to link both means and ends in national security, this capstone document for American national security lacks one of the fundamental characteristics of a sound strategy.

This monograph asks whether it is possible for the United States to develop a single grand strategy that articulates and prioritizes national interests in specific regions of the world, adopts a specific strategy to best meet those interests, and prioritizes the various tools available -- diplomatic, economic, and military -- to bring that strategy to life. The monograph includes a logical series of steps that might make it possible to design such a grand strategy: identifying key American interests, determining the proper time frame for the strategy, identifying the different regions of the world for the development of an accompanying regional sub-strategy, and finally matching these with the appropriate tools to carry each strategy through. The utility of designing such a strategy is measured against three specific criteria: feasibility, necessity, and desirability.

The monograph concludes that creating a more comprehensive strategy is certainly feasible, very much necessary, and clearly desirable at this point in history. Thus, the author recommends that the architects of this new national security strategy set the course for the Nation's future now, by developing a grand strategy as comprehensive and sophisticated as the global environment in which it must succeed.

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## INTRODUCTION

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War presented the United States with enormous opportunities. The absence of a superpower threat held the potential of freeing the US from burdensome and expensive military commitments worldwide. Moreover, US policymakers embraced the opportunity to proliferate American ideals throughout post-communist states hungry for free societies and free markets. And at long last, the US foresaw the unchecked ability to shape the new world in its image; one based upon the liberal ideals of democracy, open markets, and universal human rights.

However, those opportunities brought with them a significant problem -- one that remains with the United States in 2001. The would-be architects of the post-Cold War world never truly crafted a coherent design upon which this new global construct would be built. Successive attempts have been large on ideas but slight on details, offering lofty rhetoric without matching specific means with clearly identifiable ends. While the collapse of the Soviet Union brought the opportunity to shape the emerging international order, a well-reasoned grand strategy that married national security goals in a dynamic new international environment with the right instruments of American power was needed to provide both the motive and the means for the United States to seize the fortunes of the post-Cold War era. A decade later, the need for such a strategy remains. The complexity of the current global security environment clearly demands a more sophisticated approach to meeting its challenges and reaping its opportunities.

America's current *National Security Strategy*, published in December 1999, provides little in the way of meaningful guidance for policymakers or military force planners. It presents a few general and broadly stated national interests. It espouses a single grand strategy -- Selective Engagement -- for every region of the world, ignoring the possibility that that particular strategy may be appropriate for some regions but wholly counter-productive for others.<sup>1</sup> And significantly, it says almost nothing about which instruments of national power are most appropriate for addressing specific situations in which America finds its interests challenged on a daily basis around the world.



The Nation clearly needs a better national security strategy. Therefore, this monograph addresses whether it is possible for the United States to develop a single grand strategy that articulates and prioritizes national interests in specific regions of the world, adopts a specific strategy to best meet those interests, and prioritizes the various tools available – diplomatic, economic, and military -- to bring that strategy to life.<sup>2</sup>

The monograph includes a logical series of steps that might make it possible to design such a grand strategy. This will be done primarily by identifying key American interests, determining the proper time frame for the strategy, identifying the different regions of the world for the development of an accompanying regional sub-strategy, and finally matching these with the appropriate tools to carry each strategy through. In addition, examples of each are provided to help explain the linkage among these five elements of a new comprehensive national strategy.<sup>3</sup>

Finally, the monograph assesses the utility of creating a more coherent and useful national security strategy through the use of three fundamental criteria: whether it is feasible to create such a strategy, whether such a strategy is necessary, and if a more coherent national security strategy even desirable at this point in time. Ultimately, this monograph determines if a comprehensive national security strategy that concentrates primarily on long-term American interests, is tailored to last for a significant period of time, and is regionally focused, would more clearly and efficiently help policymakers chart America's path through the twenty-first century.

## CHAPTER ONE

### AMERICA’S GRAND STRATEGY: A CRITIQUE OF THE CURRENT NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

The president, with the publication of the *National Security Strategy*, articulates the fundamental national security goals of the United States. Since the end of the Cold War, America has seen various forms of a national security strategy trotted out before the public, only to be rethought and revised a short time later. Within the past ten years, the United States has moved from the ambitious strategy of “Engagement and Enlargement” in the early 1990s to the more measured “Selective Engagement” of 2001.<sup>4</sup>

Over the past decade, however, the United States has demonstrated remarkable difficulty in sorting out the truly vital national security issues from the more peripheral, committing its resources to a spate of crises in several regions of the world without a clearly discernable unifying vision to guide its actions. In spite of noble attempts to focus on significant, long-term, global challenges, US policymakers have too often been thrown off course by events whose short-term visibility have masked their long-term insignificance. Thus it seems the United States has tacitly given up on creating the world it wants and has instead settled upon doing little more than preventing the one it does not.

In a 1997 *Military Review* article titled “Why Aren’t Americans Better at Strategy?,” author Steven Metz of the US Army War College offered,

Clearly, the Nation is beginning to suffer the consequences of an approach to the world driven by whims and disjointed policies. Such ad hoc technique is short on precisely the characteristics that determine strategy: vision, consistency, and creativity. But even while the US desperately needs a coherent strategy, security professionals and policymakers seem incapable of developing one.<sup>5</sup>

It should not go unnoticed that Metz’s observation is as appropriate today as it was when his article was published four years ago.

One of the principal reasons the various forms of post-Cold War security strategy have suffered from this lack of grand strategic vision is that none have enjoyed the focus and coherence of the grand

strategy that guided America throughout the Cold War -- containment of the Soviet Union. The US Commission on National Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, often referred to as the Hart-Rudman Commission for its two co-chairmen, offers the following observation;

During the last half century, the national security strategy of the United States was derived largely from, focused on, and committed to the containment of Soviet Communism. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the dramatic transformation of world politics resulting from the dissolution of the Soviet Union two years later, our leaders have been searching for a unifying theme to provide a strategic framework appropriate to current and future circumstances. That search has not been easy.<sup>6</sup>

The current national security strategy, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, was published by President William J. Clinton in December 1999. It defines three core objectives of the United States: enhancing America's security, bolstering America's economic prosperity, and promoting democracy and human rights abroad. It provides three broad categories of American interests: vital interests, important national interests, and humanitarian and other interests. It summarizes the six major threats to those interests, and establishes a single grand strategy -- selective engagement -- to advance those interests around the world. And finally, the *National Security Strategy* provides a generic menu of tools available to implement the strategy.<sup>7</sup>

Ostensibly, the *National Security Strategy* provides a common foundation for the organization and execution of policy for all the instruments of American power. However, at a scant forty-nine pages, this capstone document for American national security often produces more questions than answers, especially for policymakers and strategists who must make decisions on behalf of the United States on a day-by-day basis. The major shortcomings of the current *National Security Strategy* fall into three specific categories.

### ***The Pitfall of Generalities***

To begin, the current *National Security Strategy* suffers from the same malady as have its previous incarnations -- it is overly broad and tends to embrace general themes and abstract ideals rather

than a concrete discussion of means and ends. No one could argue that any of the three core objectives of the current strategy -- enhancing security, bolstering economic prosperity, or promoting democracy and human rights -- are undesirable.<sup>8</sup> However, it is not unimaginable that these three goals could come into conflict with one another in the environment of bargaining and tradeoffs that characterizes policymaking within the US government itself, and diplomacy with the governments of other nations. By favoring lofty notions at the expense of establishing concrete priorities, national security decision making risks being set adrift in general directions rather than along definite axes.

In his book *International Relations: A Policymaker Focus*, Robert Wendzel speaks to the danger of basing policy on such abstract generalizations;

The first obstacle a policymaker needs to avoid is the formulation of objectives in terms that are too abstract and/or generalized ... concepts [of] such a generalized nature that they hide more than they reveal. [Such] abstract generalization provides the policymaker with no specifically applicable basis for handling the concrete problems with which he must deal daily. His world is one of practical specifics, not abstract generalities.<sup>9</sup>

This is particularly important when one considers that foreign policy decision makers or national security professionals alone do not manage the foreign and security policy of the United States. There are currently twenty-three departments and agencies within the US government involved in foreign affairs to some degree, ranging from the Department of State to the Departments of Agriculture, Labor, and Health and Human Services. Of those twenty-three agencies, fifteen have personnel stationed abroad.<sup>10</sup> Given the enormous number of officials from across the spectrum of government dealing with other nations on a daily basis, it is vital the primary source document for establishing and advancing the Nation's interests allows them to speak with one voice. As Colonel Dennis Drew and Dr. Donald Snow write in their book, *Making Strategy*,

In most cases, significant objectives can be achieved only through the coordinated use of the instruments of power; without coordination, they can work at cross-purposes. For a non-military example, consider that federal health officials have, for many years, supported programs to discourage the use of tobacco. During many of those same years, federal agricultural programs paid subsidies to tobacco growers. To prevent such self-defeating behavior, grand strategy must assign roles and missions, determine methods to make the assignments mutually supporting, and identify areas of potential conflict.<sup>11</sup>

Two interesting articles that appeared in US publications in February 2001 provide a more contemporary, defense-related example. In the cover story of the February 19<sup>th</sup> issue of *Newsweek* magazine, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet was quoted as testifying before the Senate Intelligence Committee that the global terrorism network of Osama bin Laden is “the most immediate threat to US national security.”<sup>12</sup> That same month, Frank Gaffney, writing in *Commentary*, reminded the public that “George Bush was elected on a platform calling explicitly for the deployment — ‘at the earliest possible time’ — of a comprehensive, effective, and global missile defense,” a promise it appears he intends to keep.<sup>13</sup>

Hence the problem with a national security strategy that speaks only in broad platitudes like “enhancing America’s security,” without a more in-depth discussion of how that can best be done. Will the scarce resources available for national security be better put to use by investing in the “coordinated global effort”<sup>14</sup> that it would take to curtail bin Laden’s activities, or in a \$60 billion missile defense shield?<sup>15</sup> If, as seems likely, the Nation cannot afford to accomplish both, the *National Security Strategy* must specify, in concrete terms, not only those goals that the United States wishes to pursue, but also the priorities it has established and the tradeoffs it is willing to make. The current *National Security Strategy* does neither.

### ***A Single Strategy for a Diverse Global Environment***

The second major problem with the current *National Security Strategy* is that it treats the entire world as a single entity. While acknowledging the “unique challenges and opportunities”<sup>16</sup> of various regions of the world, the *National Security Strategy* nonetheless prescribes a single strategy -- selective engagement -- to advance US interests in every one of them.

The current *National Security Strategy* fails to acknowledge that in practical terms, US interests -- and the best strategy for advancing them -- are wholly different in Europe than those in, say, Sub-Saharan Africa or South Asia. In December 2000, the National Intelligence Council, under the Direction of the

Director of Central Intelligence, published *Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future with Nongovernment Experts*. In its report, the council predicts that within the next fifteen years,


There will be increasing numbers of important actors on the world stage to challenge and check -- as well as reinforce -- US leadership: countries such as China, Russia, India, Mexico, and Brazil; regional organizations such as the European Union; and a vast array of increasingly powerful multinational corporations and nonprofit organizations with their own interests to defend in the world.<sup>17</sup>

The *1999 Strategic Assessment*, published by the National Defense University's Institute for National Strategic Studies, also acknowledges the diffusion of challenges to US interests from different regions of the world. In addressing the likely changes in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, the report states, "recent trends indicate all three regions will likely experience great change, and the differences between regions may widen."<sup>18</sup> The report goes on to state "if these or other changes occur, they will demand different US regional policies, as well as different approaches in implementation."<sup>19</sup>

Curiously, however, the authors of the *Strategic Assessment* follow their prediction by writing "a global perspective will be needed,"<sup>20</sup> and argue against a more regional approach to national security strategy. They believe that the clarity and coherence needed for a viable national security strategy demand a single, global perspective. However, laying the template of selective engagement upon the entire global security environment, as does the current *National Security Strategy*, accomplishes just the opposite. In failing to account for the disparate nature of threats to US interests around the world, the *National Security Strategy* seriously lacks the specificity needed to guide foreign policymaking in any meaningful way. The days of single-mindedness in American grand strategy have passed. There is no longer one global threat, and the United States can no longer afford one global strategy.

Figure 1 shows the relationship between the applicability of a national security strategy to a range of regions and their characteristics and the level of ambiguity involved in interpreting and executing it. While currently the United States' single strategy of selective engagement is intended to be applicable to most situations in every region of the world, that level of applicability is purchased at the cost of precision in dealing with specific situations and with specific nations. Thus policymakers, when confronted with

dealing with this ambiguity, are forced to resort to the “*ad hoc* technique” that Metz wrote of four years ago.



As one moves farther to the top right of Figure 1, while applicability increases, ambiguity does as well. Thus a national security strategy designed as a “one size fits all” answer to the range of challenges to US interests from around the world loses its utility as its focus widens to the global level but the differences among regional characteristics remain no less pronounced. In an effort to provide something for everyone, the current *National Security Strategy* risks providing nothing to anyone.

### ***Is the National Security Strategy a “Strategy” at All?***

The *Oxford Companion to the Politics of the World* defines strategy as “the means that policymakers choose to attain desired ends. Strategy is, in effect, a course of action, a plan for achieving specified goals.”<sup>21</sup>

Writers on strategy and national security issues tend to define strategy more specifically and differentiate between an abstract notion of the term “strategy” and the more specific definition of “grand

strategy” as it relates to national security. John M. Collins, in his famous work *Grand Strategy: Practices and Principles*, offers this definition:

National strategy fuses all the powers of a nation, during peace as well as war, to attain national interests and objectives. In compilation, they constitute “grand strategy,” the art and science of employing national power under all circumstances to exert desired degrees and types of control over the opposition through threats, force, indirect pressures, diplomacy, subterfuge, and other imaginative means, thereby satisfying national security interests and objectives.<sup>22</sup>

In their book *Making Strategy*, Colonel Dennis Drew and Dr. Donald Snow provide this definition:

Grand strategy is the art and science of coordinating the development and use of those instruments [of national power] to achieve national security objectives. Political scientists often refer to grand strategy as policy. Although policy is an arguably broader term than this definition of grand strategy, the two terms are often used synonymously.<sup>23</sup>

Another perspective is provided by Henry C. Bartlett, G. Paul Holman, and Timothy  
Somes in their article, “The Art of Strategy and Force Planning;”

At the highest level of national thinking, such a game plan [for achieving desired goals with limited means] is generally referred to as grand or national security strategy. Grand strategy should provide a clear concept of how economic, diplomatic, and military instruments of national power will be used to achieve national goals and policy.<sup>24</sup>

And at a recent conference co-sponsored by the US Army War College and Georgetown University, Cindy Williams, a senior research fellow at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology argued in broader terms that “the essence of grand strategy is setting priorities and making choices among competing interests and missions, precisely when resources are constrained.”<sup>25</sup>

There are a few elements common to all these definitions. First is the primacy of explicit national security objectives, which can then be prioritized to allow for the necessary trade-offs inherent in policymaking within a resource-constrained environment. Second is the identification of the various means available to implement the strategy. And third is the marriage of those objectives with the appropriate means for attaining them. Professor Richmond Lloyd of the Naval War College identifies the fundamental nature of crafting grand strategy succinctly when he writes, “ To obtain the most from our



limited national resources (means), we must determine where we want to go (objectives), and how we plan to get there (strategy).<sup>26</sup>

The current *National Security Strategy* offers no such framework. Its broad national security goals give way to three equally broad categories of national interests: vital -- essentially involving the survival of the state, its territory, its people, and its economy; important -- those that involve the well-being of the Nation and the international community; and important or others -- those that involve the protection and advancement of American values.<sup>27</sup> However, there is little discussion of which tools are appropriate to advance which interests and in what areas of the world. Under the subheading “Implementing the Strategy,” one finds little more than a generic statement of current capability and future good intention;

Success requires an integrated approach that brings to bear all the capabilities needed to achieve our security objectives – particularly in this era when domestic and foreign policies overlap. To effectively shape the international environment and respond to the full spectrum of potential threats, our diplomacy, military force, other foreign policy tools, and domestic preparedness efforts must be closely coordinated. We will continue to strengthen and integrate all of these capabilities.<sup>28</sup>

Thus in the current *National Security Strategy* one finds separate discussions of broadly stated goals, national interests, and tools for implementation of the strategy, but little definitive linkage among all of these elements. As John M. Collins writes;

Interests and objectives establish strategic requirements. Policies provide the rules for satisfying them. Available assets provide the means. In combination, those elements form the framework within which sensible strategies fit like pieces in a jigsaw puzzle. Given proper consideration, they help strategists to match realistic ends with measured means, minimizing risks in the process.<sup>29</sup>

And it is the collusion of means and ends that Collins writes of that can transform a document from being a simple affirmation of desires -- or a catalog of current policy initiatives -- to a robust and useful grand strategy for “seizing the opportunities of this new global era for the benefit of our people and people around the world.”<sup>30</sup> Writing in the summer 2000 issue of *Joint Force Quarterly*, Ronald W. Moore states “... in failing to link ends and means, the [current national security] strategy does not inform priorities and tradeoffs to assist in risk management.”<sup>31</sup>

The current *National Security Strategy* clearly lacks the coherence and specificity necessary to effectively guide foreign policy decision making. Its articulation of national security goals is too broad to be truly meaningful. Its adoption of a single strategy for every region of the world ignores the complexity of the current international security environment and the diversity of US interests -- and the threats to them -- in different regions of the world. And the lack of a solid and explicit linkage between ends and means prevents it from being seen as a coherent plan of action for securing the Nation's interests in the years to come.<sup>32</sup>

Given the shortfalls of the current *National Security Strategy*, it thus becomes necessary to determine how one might begin to construct a more comprehensive and effective national security strategy that successfully integrates all the elements of American power, and focuses them on advancing United States interests around the world into the twenty-first century.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **STEPS TOWARD CREATING A MORE COHERENT NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY**

Most scholars and writers of national security and strategy issues agree that the first step in developing grand strategy is to determine what national interests the state holds dear and wishes to advance in the global environment. “At the highest levels,” writes John M. Collins, “national interests comprise the underpinnings for sound strategy.”<sup>33</sup> Only through the clear identification of what specific “ends” the nation wishes to accomplish is it possible to design a coherent strategy for their ultimate attainment.

#### ***Step One: Defining National Interests***

A new national security strategy must be built upon a foundation of specific, meaningful, and attainable national interests. In his article “National Interests and Grand Strategies,” Robert J. Art writes of the fundamental importance of national interests;

Determining a nation's interests is the central task of grand strategy. How a nation defines its interests both sets its fundamental course in world affairs and significantly shapes the means chosen to get there.<sup>34</sup>

Drew and Snow also speak to the centrality of defining interests as the first step in the formulation of grand strategy;

The first task of the strategist is to define the national security objectives [or interests] that form the foundation of the strategy process. If [they] are ill-defined, inconsistent, or unsupported by some degree of national consensus, the strategist's function becomes exceedingly difficult.<sup>35</sup>

In their book *US National Security Strategy for the 1990s*, Daniel J. Kaufman, David S. Clark, and Kevin P. Sheehan differentiate between broader national interests and the more specific national security objectives that flow from them;

Objectives are the first element of national strategy. Objectives are drawn from interests and are of two types: those derived from a state's position in the world (external objectives) and those derived from a state's unique political and economic system (internal objectives).<sup>36</sup>

Since -- according to this excerpt -- specific objectives are derived from national interests, Kaufman and his colleagues imply is the primacy of national interests in the formulation of grand strategy as well.

And in its *Phase II Report*, the US Commission on National Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century writes;

Strategy and policy must be grounded in the national interest. The national interest has many strands -- political, economic, security, and humanitarian. National interests are nevertheless the most durable basis for assuring policy consistency. Gaining and sustaining public support for US policy is best achieved, too, when American principles are coupled with clearly visible national interests. Moreover, a strategy based on national interest, properly conceived, engenders respect for the interests of others.<sup>37</sup>

It is important to distinguish between those national interests that are enduring and those that are subject to change along with periodic changes in the international security environment. In his book, *America Recommitted: United States National Interests in a Restructured World*, Donald Neuchterlein identifies the fundamental US interests that have remained essentially unchanged over time. He writes;

Throughout the nation's history four long-term, enduring national interests have conditioned the way the US government viewed the external environment and this country's place in it:

- (1) Defense of the United States and its constitutional system.
- (2) Enhancement of the nation's economic well-being and promotion of US products abroad.
- (3) Creation of a favorable world order (international security environment).
- (4) Promotion abroad of US democratic values and the free market system.<sup>38</sup>

While the national interests Neuchterlein lists provide an excellent framework for considering those long-term interests worth pursuing, they are nonetheless a bit too abstract to comprise the specific national interests needed in a more coherent and useful national security strategy.

A more focused perspective is offered by the National Defense Panel, which was chartered by Defense Secretary William Cohen in 1997 to focus on “the long-term issues facing US defense and National Security.”<sup>39</sup> Chaired by Philip Odeen, the panel issued its report, *Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* in which it identified three fundamental national security interests the United States should pursue into the next century. The first is national survival, which includes countering threats of physical destruction as well as threats to undermine the US economy, its institutions, and its values. The second is global economic and political stability. This interest involves fostering cooperative relationships with friends and allies, expanding free market arrangements, ensuring a free flow of information, and enhancing interoperability with allies. And the third interest is domestic security with the imperatives of safety, protection, and preparedness in order to assure “peace of mind at home.”<sup>40</sup>

And for its part, the Hart-Rudman Commission forwards this list of national interests for consideration;

American national security strategy must find its anchor in national interests, interests that must be both protected *and advanced* for the fundamental well being of American society. We define these interests at three levels: survival interests, without which America would cease to exist as we know it; critical interests, which are causally one step removed from survival interests; and significant interests, which importantly affect the global environment in which the United States must act.<sup>41</sup>

While the above menus of national interests -- ranging from Neuchterlein’s general listing to the more specific provided by the two recent commissions -- are a good point of departure to examine possible American national interests in the years to come, a few basic points about formulating national interests should be acknowledged in crafting a new national security strategy.

First, the survival of the state, which Collins terms “the only *vital* national security interest,”<sup>42</sup> should be considered a separate, enduring, and fundamental national interest apart from any other. An expanded notion of vital interests – which places the survival of the state in the same category as other interests – will only serve to invite the commitment of precious resources toward endeavors where the potential costs far outweighs the actual benefits.

Second, there should be an explicit acknowledgement that the relative priority all other national interests – those involving economic well-being, sustaining a favorable world order, or advancing American values -- will not, and should not, remain unchanged across time and place. Interests will vary by region and by issue area, as will the intensity with which the United States will pursue them. Consequently, the priorities the United States chooses to assign each interest will likely be different for different regions of the world over time.

And third, where a particular issue falls within the range of American interests is as much a function of American behavior as it is the international security environment. Helping to ameliorate the suffering of noncombatants in a war-torn region may be considered, in the words of the current national security strategy, a “humanitarian” interest. However when US military forces are committed to accomplish that task, and American credibility and stature are leveraged, the safety of those American troops and the success of the mission immediately becomes the central issue – supplanting the cause for American intervention in the first place.

Of course the United States cannot limit itself to advancing only those interests that most directly involve the survival of the state -- nor should it. However, a clear and cogent national security strategy that is grounded in an unambiguous expression of national interests will help ensure that national security decision makers can make deliberate and reasoned decisions on the realistic costs and potential long-term benefits of applying any of the instruments of American power.

Given the above considerations, it appears that a new national security strategy would be best served by adopting a combination of those national interests put forward by both the Hart-Rudman Commission and the National Defense Panel. A possible menu of national interests in a new grand strategy could be: *national survival*, meaning the physical defense of the United States and its politico-economic system; *global economic and political stability*, protecting our allies, preventing threats to the international system and expanding a liberal economic order; and *significant interests*, those that affect the global environment as a whole, especially in terms of mitigating the pernicious effects of international crime, terrorism, environmental degradation, and human rights abuses. By essentially partitioning US

interests in thirds -- the protection of the Nation and its people, the protection of the international system from which the Nation prospers, and the protection of global environment in which the Nation lives day to day -- prioritization of effort and the allocation of resources can be done with greater clarity and forethought.

While articulating national interests is the first and most important step in developing a new national security strategy, harboring any hope of developing a grand strategy with the vision and coherence necessary to guide national security decision making over time next requires determining the appropriate time period for which one expects the strategy to remain effective.

### ***Step Two: Determining the Appropriate Life Span of the Strategy***

There is no established shelf life for a US strategy -- it should remain in place as long as it serves American interests, and abandoned when it is recognized to be essentially flawed or when the conditions that gave it life change in a fundamental way. A good example is the containment of the Soviet Union, which served the United States well for over forty years but became useless once its *raison d'être* slunk off the world stage.

For a strategy is to be truly effective, it must be grounded in a realistic vision of the environment in which it is to operate. Thus it is crucial that its creators select a time period long enough to allow their core assumptions about the future to be validated or refuted, but not so long as to make their ability to formulate predictions about the future security environment largely impractical.

In his book, *America's Strategic Future: A Blueprint for National Survival in the New Millennium*, Hubert P. Van Tuyl argues for a very long-term view in the development of grand strategy;

The choices that are made now will affect national security and our survival for the next half-century. While we look forward to the beginning of the next millennium [*sic*], we have to think in terms of the year 2050.<sup>43</sup>

The National Intelligence Council's report; *Dialogue About the Future With Nongovernment Experts* was specifically designed to "rise above short-term tactical considerations and provide a longer-

term, strategic perspective.” However its view was not as long as Van Tuyl’s -- its authors chose the year 2015 as the upper boundary for its analysis of the future strategic environment.

The National Defense Panel conducted its long-term analysis of the international environment and US national security imperatives by looking out to the year 2020.

And the Hart-Rudman Commission set the temporal limit of its analysis at the year 2025, basing its many conclusions on “the basis of ... the broad context of the international security environment that will emerge over the next quarter century.”<sup>44</sup>

It should be noted that the current *National Security Strategy* has a specified time limit as well; one year -- legislatively mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act which requires the president submit an annual report to the Congress on the national security strategy of the United States.<sup>45</sup>

Of course, there is a delicate balance between providing long-term strategic vision and merely guessing about the world to come. While Van Tuyl may be correct to argue that the United States will have to live for fifty years with the decisions it makes today, attempting to craft a strategy specific enough to be useful for that long will likely prove impossible. Even twenty years was considered too great a period for this purpose according to the analysis done by the National Defense Panel which concluded;

It was the panel’s judgment, however, that selecting a strategy appropriate for twenty years hence was not possible or desirable. Events and circumstances at that time will drive the decisions of the US leadership. Therefore, we believe that the best way to ensure our future security is to provide a process for developing the tools and concepts necessary to implement whatever the most appropriate strategy might be at that time.<sup>46</sup>

At the other extreme, while the annual iterations of a national security strategy the United States presently adheres to may allow the strategy to remain current, it runs the risk of failing to provide the long-term vision and consistency required of a coherent grand strategy. The development and execution of grand strategy is not a year-by-year process. And if national interests are properly articulated, as Neuchterlein writes, they will “rise and fall in importance over decades, rather than months or years, and compete for public attention and government resources.”<sup>47</sup> Allowing for that process requires time, and a one-year interval invites the type of shortsightedness that has made recent American national security strategies perennially devoid of vision and coherence.



A new national security strategy therefore needs to navigate through these two extremes. Considering all the competing factors involved, ten years appears to be the optimum period for a single generation of a new grand strategy-- long enough to develop a viable and meaningful long-term strategy, along with its regional components, but not so long as to force its underlying predictions about the future into the realm of pure chance. Ten years would allow for a good balance between addressing contemporary national security problems while still developing a long-term strategic vision. Ten years is also a long enough period of time to allow the tangible benefits of the strategy to bear fruit. Additionally, since no US president can serve more than eight years, a national security strategy that is built to last a decade will allow for a greater level of continuity in America's grand strategy in spite of the quadrennial changes in the executive branch.

Of course none of this is to say that once a national security strategy is adopted, it must remain free from changes -- major or minor -- within that ten-year period. However, a viable long-term grand strategy should be based upon an assessment US interests within the context of the international security environment in the impending decade. America's national security strategy should be considered its most important durable good -- perhaps subject to repair as the years pass, but nevertheless built to last.

### ***Step Three: Providing for Greater Focus -- How to Divide the World into Manageable Regions***

Given the complex nature of the contemporary international security environment, it is imperative that a new national security strategy not only recognizes how American interests differ in various regions around the world, but that it be explicit about how the United States plans to advance its interests in each of them. This requires a discreet strategy tailored for the unique environment of each region. Thus the national security strategy writ large would be, in essence, a compilation of regional sub-strategies that remain anchored to macro-level American interests while maintaining a focus on the best means for advancing them within the context of regional imperatives.

Of the several possible methods of dividing the world into manageable regions for the creation of a new national security strategy, this monograph is limited to an examination of three: geographically, geopolitically, and culturally.<sup>48</sup>

Adopting a generally geographic division of the world would entail carving out large areas of the globe based upon their relative position to one another as well as to the United States. Some attention would be given to the cultural, economic, and political environment of each region, but the preponderant consideration in determining regional boundaries would be given to the region's physical location in the world. Such a division would tend to produce a few large, contiguous and self-contained regions. This method is much like that found in the current *National Security Strategy* as well as the current *Unified Command Plan* through which regional Commanders-in-Chief are assigned their geographic areas of responsibility.<sup>49</sup>

Another method could be to adopt the more sophisticated geopolitical approach. Such an approach would also acknowledge the geographic composition and location of each region, but would give greater consideration to its unique political, economic, or cultural characteristics. This would likely produce a number of smaller regions whose frontiers are formed not only by physical or state boundaries, but also by the specific political and economic environment within the regions themselves. This is the method apparent in the Institute for National Strategic Studies' *Strategic Assessment* as well as the National Intelligence Council's report – which, for example, defines one region as the “European Union and its aspirants,” more a political and economic grouping than a geographical one.<sup>50</sup>

And finally a third -- and more radical approach -- would be to adopt a cultural division of the world that relies more on cultural characteristics than geographic or political ones. This perspective is exemplified by the work of Samuel Huntington in his book, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* in which he argues “the central and most dangerous dimension of emerging global politics [is] conflict between groups from differing civilizations.”<sup>51</sup> According to Huntington;

In this new world, local politics is the politics of ethnicity, global politics is the politics of civilizations. The rivalry of the superpowers is replaced by the clash of civilizations.<sup>52</sup>

Thus, dividing the world along Huntingtonian lines would require largely disregarding physical or present political boundaries, and would instead call for a division along ethnic, or civilizational lines. Such regions would not be self-contained, as illustrated by Huntington's Islamic civilization that includes not only the Arab Middle East and North Africa, but also parts of East Africa as well as Indonesia and Malaysia in South Asia.<sup>53</sup>

Figure two depicts these various perspectives on the major regions of the world. Those on the left side of the table, represented by the *National Security Strategy* and the *Unified Command Plan*, assume the more geographical approach. The far right represents the approach suggested by Huntington where the prime determinant of regional demarcations is culture or civilizations, and in the middle is found the geopolitical approach seen in the *Strategic Assessment* and the analysis done by the National Intelligence Council.

<b>Figure 2 Major Regions of the World According to Various Sources</b>				
<i>Current National Security Strategy</i>	<i>Current Unified Command Plan</i>	<i>Strategic Assessment</i>	<i>National Intelligence Council</i>	<i>Huntington's Civilizations</i>
1. Europe/Eurasia	1. Europe/Sub-Saharan Africa (EUCOM)	1. Europe	1. East and Southeast Asia	1. Sinic: China and Southeast Asia
2. East Asia/Pacific	2. Asia/Pacific (PACOM)	2. Russia and its Neighbors	2. South Asia	2. Japanese
3. Western Hemisphere	3. North America* (JFCOM)	3. Greater Middle East	3. Russia and Eurasia	3. Hindu: Asian Subcontinent
4. Middle East, North Africa, Southwest Asia, and South Asia	4. Latin America (SOUTHCOM)	4. Asia-Pacific	4. Middle East and North Africa	4. Islamic: Middle East/North Africa and the Malay subcivilization
5. Sub-Saharan Africa	5. Middle East/ North Africa (CENTCOM)	5. South Asia	5. Sub-Saharan Africa	5. Orthodox: Central/East Europe
	*JFCOM's actual geographic responsibility is limited to the North Atlantic as well as "emerging domestic US requirements."	6. Sub-Saharan Africa	6. European Union and its aspirants	6. Western
		7. Western Hemisphere	7. Latin America	7. Latin American

It should be noted that various departments and agencies within the United States government also divide the world into various regions, which do not match those established in the president's *National Security Strategy* or the Department of Defense's *Unified Command Plan*. The Department of State has Bureaus for African Affairs, East Asian and Pacific Affairs, European Affairs, Near Eastern Affairs, South Asian Affairs, Western Hemisphere Affairs, and Office of the Special Advisor for the New Independent States.<sup>54</sup> And the Office of the United States Trade Representative divides the world into the following regions: Africa; Asia and the Pacific; China, Hong Kong, Mongolia and Taiwan; Europe and the Mediterranean; Japan; and the Western Hemisphere.<sup>55</sup>

Thus, within the US Government itself, the primary departments and offices responsible for international diplomacy, trade, and defense issues all view the world from different regional perspectives. A new national security strategy must establish definitive regional boundaries to facilitate not only the creation of long-term strategy, but also its implementation across departmental lines.

The primarily geographic division adopted by the current *National Security Strategy* and the *Unified Command Plan* is clearly the most efficient approach -- husbanding the national security strategy for only five regions throughout the entire world. However, this methodology has created regions that are much too large and far too diverse to provide the necessary precision for any regional approach to the Nation's grand strategy. Additionally, it increases the span of control for the strategy's practitioners to nearly unmanageable proportions.

At the other extreme, while the design suggested by Huntington's work would certainly account for at least one aspect of the complexity of the world today as well as, according to Huntington's theory, the most likely source of future conflict,<sup>56</sup> dividing the world in this fashion is largely impractical for purpose of creating a viable contemporary security strategy. The world Huntington envisions may indeed come to pass, but a coherent and useful national security strategy must account for the world as it is and will likely be for the next decade. Regardless of the prognostications of many theorists, the nation-state

will likely be the most important actor in the global environment for the next two decades, and regional sub-strategies would be better anchored in the clearly distinguishable and internationally recognized frontiers of existing nations and continents.

The best approach to apportioning the world for the purpose of creating a new national security strategy is most likely that found in the National Intelligence Council's analysis of the future security environment. Of the above perspectives, the seven regions the National Intelligence Council chose are the most specific and thoughtfully selected; East and Southeast Asia; South Asia, including not only India and Pakistan but also Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Afghanistan; Russia and Eurasia, including the south Caucasus states of central Asia; The Middle East and North Africa; Sub-Saharan Africa; the European Union and its aspirants; and Latin America. Moreover, each of its regions has one or two clearly identifiable major political or economic characteristics; allowing for the clearer identification of American interests and the selection of regional sub-strategies for each.

#### ***Step Four: Creating a Menu of Regional Sub-strategies***

A new national security strategy clearly must be more comprehensive and sophisticated than the single global strategy approach the United States currently maintains. It must clearly identify American national interests within the context of a complex and dynamic contemporary international environment. It must not only embrace the national security imperatives of the here-and-now, but must also establish a shared vision of how those imperatives will change ten years hence. Moreover, it must demonstrate the level of detail necessary to advance American interests in the many different regions of the world now and in the future. Stringing all these provisions together requires the identification of possible strategies the United States may use to match objectives and interests with the means for attaining them on a regional basis. Once combined, these regional sub-strategies will comprise a new national security strategy that is an elegant mix of vision and detail.

In his article, “Time for a Revolution: The Transformation from National Defense to International Security,” Grant T. Hammond discusses how America’s place as the last remaining superpower has prompted a range of viewpoints on how the United States should cope with this new reality;

Some would like to ... actively promote a “Pax Americana” for the next century, while others think the moment has passed. Some would like to make William Wohlforth’s “Unipolar World” a manifest reality of some duration while others seek a more limited role for the United States, such as that favored by Robert Art and others who see “Selective Engagement as the answer. In between are other prescriptions for and images of America which range from being lonely to being a bully. Some see the United States as ready but reluctant. Others see it as not unwilling but unable to exert leadership in the world. There is some truth in most of these views.<sup>57</sup>

Authors Barry R. Posen and Andrew Ross argue that the countless debates about United States grand strategy since the end of the Cold War have actually revolved around four competing visions of America’s role in the new world. In their article, “Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy,” Posen and Ross list the four possible strategies the United States could embrace as it moves through the coming century: Neo-isolationism, Selective Engagement, Cooperative Security, and Primacy.<sup>58</sup> Taken together, these possible strategies offer the various ways the United States could connect its objectives and interests with its ends as the future unfolds.

*Neo-Isolationism*, what Posen and Ross call the “least ambitious” of the four options embraces a very narrow view of national interests that focuses almost exclusively on the defense and security of the United States -- the only real vital interest it espouses -- and “renders internationalism not only unnecessary, but counterproductive.”<sup>59</sup> Anchored in a staunchly realist perspective of international relations, a strategy of neo-isolationism envisions few reasons for the United States to venture into the world at large;

Given the absence of threats to the US homeland, neo-isolationism holds that national defense will seldom justify intervention abroad. The United States is not responsible for, and cannot afford the costs of, maintaining world order. The pursuit of economic well-being is best left to the private sector. The promotion of values such as democracy and human rights inspires ill-advised crusades that serve only to generate resentment against the United States; consequently, it is a poor guide to policy and strategy.<sup>60</sup>

What Posen and Ross identify as *Selective Engagement* -- the currently identified national security strategy -- is a grand strategy that seeks, above all, to ensure peace among the great powers and preserve the status quo. Based upon traditional balance of power realism, Selective Engagement could best be summed up by paraphrasing a quote from George Orwell's *Animal Farm*; all states are equal, but some states are more equal than others.<sup>61</sup> American behavior toward certain states or regions is driven by a few pragmatic factors including their proximity to the United States, their status as a world power, and their possession of nuclear weapons. Concerns over ethnic and regional conflicts are generally limited to the likelihood that they will spawn a great power conflict. Additionally, the question of humanitarian interventions is taken on a case-by-case basis, and the decision whether or not to intervene is based heavily upon domestic political considerations.<sup>62</sup>

A third strategy identified by Posen and Ross is *Cooperative Security*, the most liberal – and most demanding -- of the four whose “most distinguishing feature ... is the proposition that peace is effectively indivisible.”<sup>63</sup> The *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* that characterized the early years of the Clinton administration leaned heavily upon the premises of Cooperative Security. This particular strategy responds to the high level of interdependence that exists among all nations in the world, not just the great powers. Thomas Friedman, in his book *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* contrasted the defining characteristics of the Cold War and post-Cold War worlds, the former having the *wall* as its overriding symbol and the latter having the *web*.<sup>64</sup> While neo-isolationism and Selective Engagement are better suited to the wall, Cooperative Security is a strategy for the web.

The high level of connectivity among nations necessarily means that problems in distant lands are an American concern. A strategy of cooperative security would invite American intervention in regional conflicts not only to prevent their spread, but because their brutality is an affront to American values and sets “a malign precedent.”<sup>65</sup> Similarly, Cooperative Security recognizes the need to intervene in humanitarian crises, not only to mitigate the suffering of its victims but to deter the likelihood of future aggression that is most often their proximate cause.<sup>66</sup> Finally, unlike other strategies that favor a higher degree of unilateral action by the United States, Cooperative Security casts its lot with the efficiency and

legitimacy of international organizations “to coordinate ... and create the expectation of regular, effective intervention for peace.”<sup>67</sup>

The final strategy of the four is *Primacy*, which states that only American power can ensure lasting peace.<sup>68</sup> This is the perspective offered by columnist Charles Krauthammer in his widely noted 1991 *Foreign Affairs* article, “The Unipolar Moment.” Krauthammer writes;

We are in abnormal times. Our best hope for safety in such times, as in difficult times past, is in American strength and will – the strength and will to lead a unipolar world, unashamedly laying down the rules of world order and being prepared to enforce them.<sup>69</sup> Whereas Selective Engagement is focused on the peaceful relations among the present great

powers, Primacy seeks to make certain that peace by curtailing the rise of future great powers as well. As Posen and Ross write;

Advocates of primacy view the rise of a peer competitor from the midst of the great powers to offer the greatest threat to international order and thus the greatest risk of war. The objective of primacy, therefore, is not merely to preserve peace among the great powers, but to preserve US supremacy by politically, economically, and militarily outdistancing any global challenger.<sup>70</sup>

A strategy of primacy would involve viewing regional conflicts and humanitarian crises through the lens of their possible effect on the rise of a regional hegemon or the erosion of US leadership. Primacy would also involve cooperating with international organizations, but only to the extent that they offer legitimacy to measures designed to advance US interests, and do not impose undue restraint on US action. Similarly, the United States would embrace the liberal ideals of international law, and the promotion of democracy and free-market principles as a means of asserting America’s position of leadership in the world.<sup>71</sup> Thus, a strategy of primacy advocates liberal means for achieving more realist ends.

The above listing of possible US grand strategies is, of course, not exhaustive -- there are countless variations and combinations of each. However, the lack of focus and general inefficiency of successive national security strategies over the past decade is not due to the right strategy simply not having been chosen. Rather, the architects of a new national security strategy must come to understand that *any single strategy*, draped over the entire world, will inevitably fall short of providing the necessary clarity and effectiveness required to advance American interests in the complex environment of the post-



Cold War world. The above strategies provide an excellent menu from which to choose, but they must be adopted and employed on a regional, rather than a global level.

***Step Five: Identifying the Tools to Implement the Strategy***

Finally, a new national security strategy must be constructed from a broader view of national security, integrating more than the traditional hard power instrument of military power alone. The National Defense Panel came to this very conclusion in its report to the Secretary of Defense;

In the increasingly complex world that we foresee, the Department of Defense and its armed services cannot preserve US interests alone. Defense is but one element of a broader national security structure. If we are to be successful in meeting the challenges of the future, the entire US national security apparatus must adapt and become more integrated, coherent, and proactive.<sup>72</sup>

The Hart-Rudman Commission reached a similar conclusion about the expanded notion of national security and, consequently, the tools needed to implement a future security strategy, stating; “[the] emerging security environment in the next quarter century will require different military and other national capabilities ... using all the instruments of American diplomatic, economic, and military power.”<sup>73</sup>

And the preface of the current *National Security Strategy* implies this perspective as well, although it follows the statement “The United States must have the tools necessary to carry out this strategy,” with a three paragraph-long riff on the current readiness and capabilities of the US military. By contrast, a discussion of diplomacy is given two shorter paragraphs, and economics gets nine lines.

Properly identifying the range of specific tools available to advance the national security strategy is no small matter and is of the utmost importance not only to the crafters of grand strategy but to military leaders as well. Marine Corps *Doctrinal Publication 1-1 (Strategy)* makes the point well;

Most importantly, [military professionals] must understand that *military force is an inappropriate tool for the solution of most political difficulties*. Force is at best a necessary means for clearing obstacles to more peaceful solutions.<sup>74</sup>

John M. Collins views the tools available to implement a grand strategy as being equal to the elements of national power itself and offers an exhaustive list including, among others: political power, economic power, scientific and technological power, and military power.<sup>75</sup>

Authors Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf list four instruments of US foreign and security policy: military might, covert action, propaganda, and foreign aid.<sup>76</sup>

Under its definition of national security strategy, Joint Publication 1-02, *The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, also lists four tools to implement national security strategy: diplomatic, economic, military, and informational.<sup>77</sup> Other military publications, including the draft version of the Army's *Field Manual 3-0 (Operations)* and the Marine Corps' *Doctrinal Publication 1-1 (Strategy)* ascribe to these four elements as well.

And in their article "The Art of Strategy and Force Planning," Bartlett, Holman, and Some identify the three tools available to implement a grand strategy that are most commonly cited by scholars and writers of national security and strategy issues. First is the economic, which they define as trade agreements, foreign aid, and government expenditures. The diplomatic tool ranges from alliances and ad hoc coalitions to treaties and negotiations. And the military instrument includes all the manifestations of military might, from nuclear weaponry and the ability to wage conventional war to peacekeeping and operations other than war.<sup>78</sup>

Given the choice among the above perspectives, the designers of a new national security strategy would probably be best served by considering the list offered by Bartlett, Holman, and Some. Doing so would not only allow greater flexibility in planning the implementation of regional sub-strategies, but would also make it easier to identify those government departments and agencies most clearly aligned with the available tools.

### ***A Comprehensive National Security Strategy: Bringing it All Together***

Thus far, this monograph has identified all the critical elements of a new national security strategy. First, it is to be built upon a firm foundation of specific, meaningful, and attainable national

interests. In this case, those interests would be national survival, global economic and political stability, and significant interests.

Second, the new national security is to be constructed to last ten years -- long enough to develop a viable long-term strategy, but not so long as to force its underlying assumptions about the future security environment into the domain of pure conjecture.

Third, the overall grand strategy will be a compilation of regional sub-strategies designed to advance US interests within the unique environment of each region. The seven regions selected are based upon a geopolitical division of the world and include: East and Southeast Asia; South Asia; Russia and Eurasia; the Middle East and North Africa; Sub-Saharan Africa; the European Union and its aspirants; and Latin America.

Fourth, the menu of options for regional sub-strategies are provided by the four major competing visions of grand strategy that have been ably debated since the end of the Cold War. They are: Neo-isolationism; Selective Engagement; Cooperative Security; and Primacy.

And fifth, the tools available to implement each regional sub-strategy fall into one of three categories: the military tool, the diplomatic tool, and the economic tool.

Transitioning from these fairly abstract notions into their practical application requires bringing them all together to create the building blocks for a more comprehensive national security strategy. Selecting two of the seven regions for closer examination, Russia and Eurasia, and Sub-Saharan Africa, provides an example of how this can be done.

Both the Institute for National Strategic Studies' *Strategic Assessment* and the National Intelligence Council's report paint a bleak and alarming picture of the Russia and Eurasia region for the next ten years. Russia itself suffers from erratic movement toward a viable market economy due to poor planning, internal political struggles, and corruption. Its path to becoming a fully functioning democracy has fared no better for many of the same reasons. Russia's military is in decline, and its foreign policy appears to be more reactionary than visionary -- attempting to address very real problems close to home,

like the radical Islamic threat on its southern doorstep, and less plausible problems on the world stage, such as attempting to resist its perception of a burgeoning American hegemony.<sup>79</sup>

The former Soviet republics in the Caucasus region are similarly rife with internal conflict that threatens to assume external dimensions. The lack of central government authority in most states in area, as well as widespread lawlessness and ethnic conflict create a dangerous mix violence and instability.<sup>80</sup>

Two issues in the Russia and Eurasia region should remain foremost in the minds of US strategists for the next ten years. First is the potential for great power confrontation over the valuable oil and gas reserves in the Caspian Sea region. The routing of pipelines, and the prospective economic benefit for the countries they will traverse, has the potential to cause enormous interstate competition and instability in the region. Additionally, as the National Intelligence Council's assessment states;

The interests of China, Russia, and India – as well as of Iran and Turkey – will intersect in Central Asia; the states of that region will attempt to balance those powers as well as keep the United States and the West engaged to prevent their domination by an outside power.<sup>81</sup>

The second issue, and one that could potentially present a colossal danger to the United States, is the apparent lack of control over Russia's nuclear arsenal. According to the *Strategic Assessment*,

Since the Soviet Union's demise, a new threat has arisen: Russia cannot guarantee full control over its nuclear weapons, fissile material, or nuclear scientists. Over the last eight years, the United States and Russia have sought to ameliorate this problem, but the turmoil facing Russia in the future will exacerbate it. Over the next decade, the United States has an interest in ensuring control over Russia's weapons, fissile material, and scientific expertise.<sup>82</sup>

The outlook for the second example, Sub-Saharan Africa, is a bit more mixed. The *Strategic Assessment* sees an Africa that “is neither sliding into hell nor ascending to heaven.”<sup>83</sup> The domestic and interstate wars that have plagued Africa throughout the memorable past are likely to continue, although the rise of nascent sub-regional organizations to encourage dialog and conflict resolution is a positive trend. There has been some movement toward democratization and greater political freedom, although that progress has been limited by a general inexperience with democratic processes in the region as well as the lack of legitimate governmental and legal institutions to guide them along. There has been some economic growth among African economies over the past few years, but that growth has been uneven and

Africa's reliance on export trade makes it more sensitive to the vicissitudes of the world economy than its more well off global trading partners.<sup>84</sup> The future of Africa is up for grabs.

The National Intelligence Council perceives the main drivers of Africa's future to be "demographics and disease -- as well as poor governance ..."<sup>85</sup> The progression of AIDS will likely decimate the most productive members of society, having devastating economic as well as social consequences. In short, the Institute for National Strategic Studies offers the following net assessment of Africa in the near future;

Africa is making progress, but it has a long way to go before democracy and prosperous markets succeed. In the future, marginal progress can be expected in ways that will have a cumulative effect over the long haul. In the interim, areas of Africa will continue to experience local instability, ethnic strife, and wars. This mixture of caution and hope provides the framework for shaping US policy toward Africa in the coming decade.<sup>86</sup>

Given the assessment of these two very different regions, it is clear that one single strategy cannot satisfy US interests in both of them for the next decade. Therefore, aligning all of the stated elements of a new national security strategy, and cross walking them for each of these regions demonstrates how regional sub-strategies can be developed and the tools to implement them identified. Figure three is a graphic representation of how this can be done.

<i>Figure 3</i> <b>Example Matrix of Regional Interests, Sub-Strategies, and</b>			
<i>Region</i>	<i>Priority of Interests</i>	<i>Regional Strategy</i>	<i>Priority of Tools</i>
1. Russia and Eurasia	1.Global economic and political stability 2.National survival 3.Significant interests	Selective Engagement	1.Diplomatic 2.Economic 3.Military
2. Sub-Saharan Africa	1.Significant interests 2.Global economic and political stability 3.National survival	Cooperative Security	1.Economic 2.Diplomatic 3.Military

The top priority of US interests in Russia and Eurasia is preventing the burgeoning chaos of the region from adversely affecting global economic and political stability, especially regarding great power competition for the spoils of its valuable natural resources. One step removed from global stability is the interest of stemming the proliferation of nuclear weapons arising from the rubble of the Soviet Union that has the potential, if given the right conditions, to affect the safety and survival of the United States. And the third priority is America's significant interest in addressing the international crime and environmental degradation that threatens to internationalize what are, currently, regional problems.

Given the priority of US interests in the context of the regional environment, a strategy of Selective Engagement would be the best way to advance those interests in Russia and Eurasia. Selective Engagement seeks to ensure peace among the great powers, and the intersection of those great powers in the Caspian Sea region presents the potential for conflict. Also, Russia's status as a nuclear power and its long history with the United States leads American policymakers to deal with it differently than it would another nation with a similar sized economy and conventional military force. Consequently, American concerns of regional conflicts are all seen within the context of their likelihood of setting off a great power conflict, either among those covetous of the region's natural resources or between the United States and a belligerent Russia wary of too much American intervention in its traditional sphere of influence.

Given US interests in the region, and the regional sub-strategy of Selective Engagement, the best tool to implement Selective Engagement in Russia and Eurasia would be diplomacy. By using the diplomatic leadership and good offices of the United States, American may, at best, help Russia and the region farther along the road to democracy and free market economies, or at worst simply keep the Russia and Eurasia's problems confined to the region. Following closely behind diplomacy is the economic tool, using a mixture US public and private investment in both Russia and its former republics. And third in the priority of tools is the military. Although military-to military contacts, joint exercises, and international military exchanges can have a positive effect on the regional environment, the actual employment of

military force in the region beyond these goodwill visits would likely ignite the very great power conflict the United States seeks to avert.

The priority of US interests in Sub-Saharan Africa is different, and therefore the regional sub-strategy and the tools to implement it are different as well. The first priority of interests falls in the category of significant interests -- particularly mitigating the adverse effects of disease, poverty, over urbanization and environmental degradation. While acknowledging that it may be difficult to articulate a large number of direct US interests in the region, the suffering Africa's people will prove difficult to ignore and some level of United States involvement in the future will be largely unavoidable. However, American interests in Sub-Saharan Africa not only humanitarian in nature. According to the National Intelligence Council:

Filling the void [left by the former colonial powers] will be ... international crime syndicates and drug traffickers; foreign mercenaries; and international terrorists seeking safe haven.<sup>87</sup>

The second priority interest in the region is global economic and political stability, which affects Africa in two directions. First is ensuring that the tentative steps toward greater democratization and economic liberalization within the region ultimately lead to Africa's greater integration into the global marketplace, and second that the effects of that often volatile market not become so burdensome on African economies that many states decide the costs of integration outweigh its benefits and chose to leave themselves behind. Finally, a very distant third priority is national survival, which does not realistically appear will be threatened directly or indirectly by any of the goings on in Africa in the next decade.

This combination of US regional interests and the environment of Sub-Saharan Africa invite a regional sub-strategy of Cooperative Security for the next decade. While this strategy is built upon the premise that peace is indivisible, America must also acknowledge that misery is indivisible as well. There is no great threat of a great power confrontation in Sub-Saharan Africa, so the United States can afford to be a bit more ambitious here than in other regions of the world. Cooperative Security for Sub-Saharan

Africa would embrace the notion that a superpower like the United States cannot ignore the region's manifold problems and still lay claim to the mantle of international leadership. Also by working closely with international organizations – one of the key features of Cooperative Security -- the United States would not only be able to largely avoid the risky endeavor of unilateral action in Africa, but would also encourage the further growth and development of the region's international organizations currently struggling to get on their feet.

Visible US leadership in Africa since the end of the Cold War either has been modest, as in Rwanda, or has proved disastrous, as in Somalia. Therefore, the success of the regional sub-strategy of Cooperative Security in Sub-Saharan Africa depends upon prioritizing the correct tools for its implementation. The primary tool in this case would be economic, which may include encouraging a deepening of US trade relations with African states, aiding agricultural development throughout the region, and leading the world in some level of debt relief for many of Africa's cash-strapped nations.<sup>88</sup> The tool second in priority would be diplomatic, applied multilaterally to promote an end to regional conflicts, develop democratic institutions within the region's states, and further the progress of multinational organizations within the region. The third priority tool would be the military. It is important to remember that while a strategy of Cooperative Security favors intervention in regional conflict and humanitarian crises, that intervention need not be confined to the use of the military. The use of the military instrument in Sub-Saharan Africa would have to be viewed as a temporary remedy at best, and that economic and diplomatic initiatives are better suited to solving Africa's long-term problems.

The above two examples show how it is possible to bring together all the elements of a new national security strategy to provide greater clarity and precision to the question of how best to match ends and means in order to advance US interests in the complex international environment of the post-Cold War world. A similar matrix would be constructed that includes the other five regions as well, each with their own priority of interests, regional sub-strategy, and priority of tools for its implementation.

However, a matrix is not a strategy. It is an instrument through which the crafters of a grand strategy can clearly identify the fundamental priorities and necessary trade-offs inherent in designing a



macro-strategy that integrates all the elements of American power and applies them to where they can reap the greatest benefit. Once this is done, the regional elements can be combined and verbalized to create a document that is comprehensive, achievable, and –most importantly – useful to the thousands of practitioners throughout the government who must execute America’s national security strategy throughout the world on a daily basis.

### CHAPTER THREE

#### THE BENEFITS OF A MORE COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: APPLYING THE CRITERIA

This monograph began by asking whether it is possible for the United States to develop a single grand strategy that articulates and prioritizes national interests in specific regions of the world, adopts a specific strategy to best meet those interests, and prioritizes the various tools available to bring that strategy to life. Properly addressing that question requires the application of three specific criteria:

**Feasibility:** The degree to which America's national security apparatus, as it is currently configured or could reasonably be configured in the near future, is able to construct such a strategy using the elements and the process identified in this monograph.

**Necessity:** Adopting the approach identified in this monograph will address many of the problems of the current *National Security Strategy* that have been previously identified in this monograph and widely commented upon by writers and scholars of issues surrounding national security strategy.

**Desirability:** The benefit of creating a new national security strategy in this manner is greater than the benefit of maintaining the status quo exemplified by the current *National Security Strategy*.

By applying the above criteria, it will be possible to gain a clearer perspective of why it may be advantageous for the United States to depart from the method of designing its grand strategy it has used since the end of the Cold War and adopt this new approach to a more comprehensive national security strategy.

#### ***Criterion One: Feasibility***

In its current configuration, America's national security apparatus -- the statutory members of the National Security Council (NSC), the National Security Council Staff, and all the cabinet and sub-cabinet agencies and departments involved in creating the national security strategy -- could very well create a more comprehensive national security strategy according to the framework outlined in this monograph.<sup>89</sup> However doing so would require two reasonable preconditions.

First would be an improvement in interagency cooperation among all the actors involved in the making of national security strategy. Authors Gregory D. Foster and Gabriel Marcella point to the institutional tension that exists among the various players in the arena of national security, specifically: the National Security Advisor, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the various stakeholders who enter and leave the process according to the issue at hand.<sup>90</sup> In particular, prioritizing tools for the implementation of regional sub-strategies would be made more difficult, if not impossible, if those determinations were bound by bureaucratic turf-battles over who wants, or does not want, the priority of effort in a given region. And second, all the various actors would have to agree to the expanded notion of national security, beyond their particular functions, that would be an integral part of a more comprehensive national security strategy.

Increasing the chance of success for developing a new national security strategy along these lines however, would most likely require some institutional change that is not only reasonable, but long overdue. The structure of departments and policymaking bodies involved in national security today has changed little since 1947 when President Truman signed the National Security Act that gave them life.<sup>91</sup> Thus in spite of the monumental changes in the international security environment that have taken place in the past half-century, not to mention the past decade, the governmental institutions in place to make national security strategy remain unchanged.<sup>92</sup>

The *Strategic Assessment* addresses the possibility of the need for some organizational change within the US government to reflect new realities;

New strategic problems may mandate new organizational solutions for performing the central task of weaving foreign policy, international economic policy, and defense strategy into a seamless web of strong, mutually reinforcing actions.<sup>93</sup>

The Hart-Rudman Commission recommends certain specific institutional changes that would make the creation of a new national security strategy as outlined in this monograph much more feasible. To provide a more integrated and long-term strategic vision, it recommends the president personally guide a top-down strategic planning process, coordinated by his National Security Advisor.<sup>94</sup> This would facilitate the long-term vision currently lacking in US grand strategy. To allow for the greater integration

of the tools necessary to create a more comprehensive national security strategy, it recommends making the Secretary of the Treasury a statutory member of the NSC.<sup>95</sup> Thus, the executive agents responsible for the three tools identified in the creation of a new national security strategy -- diplomatic, economic, and military -- would be represented in the NSC. In addition, it recommends that the State Department be reorganized to create five regional Under Secretaries responsible “for all foreign policy activities in their areas of responsibility.”<sup>96</sup> Although the regions the Hart-Rudman Commission identifies are different than those selected in this monograph, this proposal is nonetheless a positive step toward creating the institutions to support a regionally focused national security strategy.<sup>97</sup>

Of course constructing a more comprehensive national security strategy requires the architecture in place not only for its creation, but also for its execution. This is feasible today, even with the current national security structure that has been in place since the early days of the Cold War. However, creating and maintaining such a strategy becomes much more feasible if some necessary institutional changes, like those outlined by the Hart-Rudman Commission, are adopted by the US government.

### ***Criterion Two: Necessity***

Chapter one identified the three major shortcomings of the current *National Security Strategy*: its reliance on abstract generalizations, its adoption of a single strategy for the entire world, and its lack of explicit linkage among ends and means, all of which call into question whether the current *National Security Strategy* is truly a grand strategy at all. Steven Metz wrote four years ago “the absence of a unified strategy is rapidly passing from a bearable handicap to a true danger.”<sup>98</sup> However, not everyone agrees that the United States assumes a great risk by not having a grand strategy that reflects and imposes that unifying vision of national security.

Robert Jervis, writing in the summer 1998 issue of the *Naval War College Review*, argues that the absence of a grand strategy is no great cause for alarm; “The reason why the United States will not develop a grand strategy is the same reason why one is not necessary: the current world ... presents no

pressing threats.”<sup>99</sup> While one may argue about the merit of Jervis’s statement regarding the absence of threats, he appears to be missing an even larger point. According to Jervis, threats drive interests and interests drive strategy -- thus the absence of a tangible threat initiates a logic train that makes strategy wholly unnecessary. However, an American national security strategy for the post-Cold War world cannot be driven by threats alone. Rather, a great power operating in the midst of an interdependent world must look past possible threats and seize potential opportunities. And the absence of a national security strategy that identifies the process for doing so is clearly problematic.

There is no dearth of critiques of the current *National Security Strategy*, the manner in which it has been executed in recent years, or the consequences of both to national security.<sup>100</sup> Many of the criticisms generally fall into one or more of three categories; criticisms for its lack of coherence, for its lack of consistency, and for its ability to inform crisis management. William G. Hyland writes, “the intellectual and strategic vacuum left by the end of the Cold War has made it unusually difficult to formulate grand strategy,”<sup>101</sup> and as a result America has been left with no coherent strategy to guide it through these troublesome times. Hyland characterizes recent national security policy as being adrift, “buffeted by cross currents from the Left and Right, from internationalists and unilateralists. Even simple questions, such as how to define the national interest, could not be easily answered.”<sup>102</sup>

Regarding the issue of consistency, Condoleeza Rice, writing in the January/February 2000 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, states;

American policies must help further [favorable] trends by maintaining a disciplined and consistent foreign policy that separates the important from the trivial. Instead, [recently] every issue has been taken on its own terms – crisis by crisis, day by day. In a democracy as pluralistic as ours, the absence of an articulated “national interest” either produces fertile ground for those wishing to withdraw from the world or creates a vacuum to be filled by parochial groups and transitory pressures.<sup>103</sup>

Consequently, the lack of both coherence and consistency make crisis management a great deal more challenging. Robert Jervis writes, “... with less to anchor American policy, smaller events will exert greater influence.”<sup>104</sup> Thus, the lack of a grand strategy that matches means with ends makes it exceedingly difficult to distinguish between those urgent problems that require the commitment of precious American resources, and those best left to others.

A new, more comprehensive national security strategy can mitigate these menacing trends in national security. Clearly establishing national interests and then advancing them according to their relative importance through focused regional sub-strategies can achieve the needed coherence. Designing a national security strategy to endure for a decade will demonstrate a consistency in grand strategy that will be reassuring to the American people and America's allies, and can be unsettling to its potential foes. And crisis management will be made much easier if the priority of interests and tools for each region are established long before a crisis occurs, rather than falling back on *ad hoc* policymaking during a crisis when the stakes are high and the time to make decisions is radically compressed. A comprehensive national security strategy that demonstrates these attributes is not only feasible, but also clearly necessary.

### ***Criterion Three: Desirability***

Of course it would be much easier to continue the current method of drafting America's national security strategies. The systems for doing so are already in place. The difficult work of prioritizing interests, developing regional strategies and assigning the proper tools to implement them could be avoided, as could many of the hard choices incumbent in that process. As Condoleezza Rice accurately points out, "It takes courage to set priorities because doing so is an admission that American foreign policy cannot be all things to all people – or rather to all interest groups ... if priorities are not clear, they cannot be criticized."<sup>105</sup> Moreover, the national security bureaucracy would be able to avoid the natural discomfort and resistance that is the defining feature of change in any organization as large as the US government.

However, the current *National Security Strategy*, as well as subsequent strategies likely to be produced by the same process, clearly lacks the necessary elements to guide national security decision making in any meaningful way. Moreover, the lack of a comprehensive grand strategy not only invites wide interpretation -- and therefore inconsistent application -- but also makes the deliberate allocation of limited resources much more difficult.

The military instrument of American power is a perfect example of the tangible effects of a grand strategy that is long on ideals but short on specifics. Speaking at the National Press Club in December 2000, Joint Chiefs Chairman Henry Shelton had this to say about the mismatch between means and ends as it relates to the military;

We should take the National Security and National Military Strategies, figure out what is necessary to support the objectives of those strategies, and then develop the force structure to support them. In other words, *we should figure out what to do before we decide how to do it*. The resourcing piece then comes after these two steps. This, ladies and gentlemen, is the critical part! We have to get this right and we must do it in the right order! Strategy first, then force structure. [emphasis added]<sup>106</sup>

Speaking at the headquarters of the West Virginia National Guard two months later, President George Bush lamented that he is “worried that we are trying to be all things to all people around the world.”<sup>107</sup>

Both statements are indicative of why the benefits of a comprehensive national security strategy that establishes a straightforward linkage of ends and means far outweighs the benefits of the status quo. If two of the three officials within the US government most directly involved in the application of the military instrument of power publicly state they are uncomfortable with what forces are needed to advance the current *National Security Strategy*, and when they should be employed, the desire for radical change is obvious.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **SOME ALTERNATIVE VIEWS ON CREATING A MORE COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY**

The logic of developing a new, more comprehensive national security strategy is by no means unassailable. One could argue that vagueness and ambiguity is often necessary in national-level strategy. Ambiguity can grant a level of flexibility for decision makers who must respond to crises and bargain on behalf of the United States to advance American interests in a variety of potentially volatile situations. Ambiguity could also be beneficial in that it denies would-be adversaries adequate knowledge of how the United States would react to certain provocations. Thus, a national security strategy that is too explicit about means and ends could conceivably limit the options available for decision makers and telegraph American intentions to a global audience of friends who may not like the priorities the United States has set, and adversaries who wish to exploit them.

However, while vagueness may be an asset in communicating with others around the world, it is an absolute liability in communicating with the American people and the government that works on their behalf. The great shortcoming of the current *National Security Strategy* is that its vagueness is not the result of intentional diplomatic shrewdness, but rather the lack of commitment to concrete national interests that can be prioritized on a regional basis, and the identification of the strategies and tools to see them through. The benefits of a comprehensive national security strategy that leverages the diplomatic, economic, and military power of the United States to realize the most benefit in the contemporary international environment far outweigh the potential costs of being too direct with other nations about where the United States intends to go in the future and how it expects to get there.

Another reasonable argument is that the current *National Security Strategy* is as much a product of America's culture as any level of strategic vision, and that developing a more straightforward and comprehensive strategy designed for the long-term would be impossible in America's pluralistic society. This is the argument advanced by both Steven Metz and Robert Jervis. Metz writes that America's



“astrategic” character reflects both America’s general impatience with the pace of events as well as its historical suspicion of central government control;

Where Asians and Europeans will wait decades for the attainment of objectives, the United States flits from tactic to tactic, giving each only the briefest period to generate tangible results ... any sort of central planning is considered a potential threat to freedom. A rigid plan is seen as the depersonalized equivalent of a dictator, and instead flexibility, manifested as “muddling through,” is favored.<sup>108</sup>

And while Jervis presents a similar characterization of America’s strategic culture, he asserts that when combined with the external environment, the creation of a comprehensive grand strategy becomes a tall order indeed;

[In] the current era, the lack of a plausible candidate for a single unifying value or a motive that should animate all American foreign policy greatly magnifies the difficulties of creating a coherent grand strategy.<sup>109</sup>

Although Jervis and Metz may be correct in their prescient observations on American strategic culture, they overstate their importance in the creation of grand strategy. It would be difficult to argue that if given the choice, Americans would prefer the ambiguity and lack of focus of the current *National Security Strategy* over a more comprehensive and useful grand strategy. Americans – or rather the percentage of whom are concerned about such matters -- have the right to demand a national security strategy that provides consistency and coherence, if for no other reason than to better ensure the resources of the Nation are put to the best use to secure the United States at home and its interests abroad.

And a third, and perhaps the most compelling, argument concerns the regional focus of this comprehensive national security strategy -- that the United States would be ill-served by attempting to reduce the world into its constituent elements, sacrificing the larger view of global imperatives for a more myopic perspective of regional American interests. Moreover, one could argue that this more regional approach denies the linkage of global events in an interdependent world and ignores transnational dangers to US security which, according to the *Strategic Assessment*, the Hart-Rudman Commission, the National Intelligence Council, and the current *National Security Strategy*, pose a grave risk to the security of United States in the years to come.<sup>110</sup>

However, adopting a more regional focus and developing regional strategies is a process that imparts focus and discipline. It forces policymakers to define US interests in a more exacting fashion, truly focusing on the most important goals and objectives in each region without being led astray by attempting to meet abstract global strategic goals in regions where the United States actually has no great interest or likelihood of success. With this approach, the larger view is provided by taking the collection of strategies as a whole and seeing how each supports long-term US global interests.

In addition, while it is true that the international narcotics trade, terrorism, and weapons proliferation -- among other extra-territorial threats -- have no respect for political or geographic boundaries, it is also true that they spring from specific causes in certain regions of the world. The development of a regionally focused and comprehensive national security strategy will allow the United States to address these threats at their source, rather than being left to react to them wherever manifest themselves around the world. This approach does not ignore global linkage or interdependence, but rather allows for the complexity of the world to be better addressed by breaking it into its component parts -- permitting a closer examination of US interests in each region and more intensive management of the tools available to secure them.

## CONCLUSION

It has been said, “The essence of strategy is not to choose a path that leads to victory, but to position oneself so that the most paths lead to victories.”<sup>111</sup> A comprehensive national security strategy that directs the use of all the elements of national power -- diplomatic, economic, and military -- in given situations around the world can accomplish this noble purpose.

Developing such a national security strategy would require the United States to reach beyond the superficiality of its current strategy to a truly grand strategy that has several specific attributes.

A more comprehensive strategy would be grounded in a specific set of American national interests designed for the protection of the Nation and its people, the protection of the international system from which the Nation prospers, and the protection of global environment in which the Nation lives day to day.

The strategy would be built to last a decade, long enough to allow the its tangible benefits to bear fruit, but not so long as to force its underlying predictions about the future into the realm of pure chance. It would also be regionally focused, with a discreet strategy tailored for the geopolitical environment of each region, making the grand strategy -- in essence -- a compilation of regional sub-strategies anchored to macro-level American interests while maintaining its focus on the best means for advancing them within the context of regional imperatives. Each regional sub-strategy would be chosen based upon a combination of the priority of American interests in the region as well as the region’s unique security environment.

And finally a new, more comprehensive national security strategy would expand the notion of national security and apply all the available tools – diplomatic, economic, and military – in the priority best suited to advancing American interests in every region of the world.

Creating such a strategy is certainly feasible, and could be made more so with some long overdue organizational changes in America’s national security bureaucracy. It is also very much necessary, allowing for a greater level of coherence in its vision, consistency in its application, and utility in crisis

management. Moreover, a new grand strategy with these attributes is clearly desirable at this point in history, where the executors of America's national security strategy are continually forced to make informed choices and sometimes-difficult trade-offs about how best to apply the Nation's scarce national security resources for the greatest benefit and with the least acceptable risk.

America needs this more comprehensive and innovative approach to securing its interests in the dynamic and complex global security environment of the next ten years and beyond. The architects of a new national security strategy should set the course for the Nation's future now, by developing a grand strategy as comprehensive and sophisticated as the global environment in which it must succeed.

## END NOTES

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<sup>1</sup> U.S. President. *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999), 3. The current *National Security Strategy* leans heavily on the word “engagement,” but only clarifies the practical level of that engagement on page 3, “Our engagement therefore must be selective ...”

<sup>2</sup> The three primary instruments of American power that will be considered for the purposes of this monograph are the diplomatic, military, and economic. Although some works -- notably military publications -- address an informational instrument of American power, I have chosen not to include it for two reasons. First, it tends to be poorly defined and would serve to obfuscate rather than illuminate a concise discussion of the application of American power. And second, most of the major scholarly works on the formulation of strategy focus only on the three I have chosen to use. As Henry C. Bartlett, G. Paul Holman, and Timothy E. Somes write, “The means or tools available to execute the chosen strategy comprise, theoretically, the total resources of the country. In practice, however, strategists and force planners have usually thought in terms of three basic sets of tools ... the economic ... the diplomatic ... [and the] military.” See Bartlett, Holman, and Somes, “The Art and Strategy of Force Planning,” in *Strategy and Force Planning*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, eds. Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, Naval War College (Newport: Naval War College Press, 2000), 21.

<sup>3</sup> The genesis of this monograph was a panel discussion held at the 2000 IFPA-Fletcher Conference whose theme was “National Strategies and Capabilities for a Changing World.” The discussion centered on the question of what is driving our national security strategy, and what should. The topics discussed included the relative importance of certain regions, if long-term coherence in strategy is even possible, and what future clarifying concept might arise to replace “containment.” Many of these topics are addressed in this monograph. My thanks to Dr. Bob Berlin, who attended the conference, for sharing his materials with me.

<sup>4</sup> For an excellent illustration of the difference between the two national security strategies, simply compare the lofty and optimistic tenor of the 1994-95 strategy of engagement and enlargement; “Our nation can only address this era's dangers and opportunities if we remain actively engaged in global affairs. We are the world's greatest power, and we have global interests as well as responsibilities,” with more circumspect 1999 document; “American engagement must be tempered by recognition that there are limits to America's involvement in the world, and that decisions to commit resources must be weighed against the need to sustain our engagement over the long term.” See U.S. President. *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), xvi, and U.S. President. *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999), 3.

<sup>5</sup> Steven Metz. “Why Aren’t Americans Better at Strategy?” *Military Review* 77. (January/February 1997): 188.

<sup>6</sup> The United States Commission on National Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, *Seeking a National Strategy: A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom. The Phase II Report on a U.S. National Security Strategy for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. Available from <http://www.nssg.org>, 5.

<sup>7</sup> U.S. President. *National Security Strategy*, iii – 3.

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<sup>8</sup> Ibid., iii.

<sup>9</sup> Robert L. Wendzel. *International Relations: A Policymaker Focus* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1980), 192.

<sup>10</sup> Gabriel Marcella, "National Security and the Interagency Process: Forward Into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century," in *Organizing for National Security*, ed. Douglas T. Stuart (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2000), 190-191.

<sup>11</sup> Colonel Dennis Drew and Dr. Donald Snow. *Making Strategy* (Maxwell: Air University Press, 1988), 17.

<sup>12</sup> Mark Hosenball and Evan Thomas, "Danger: Terror Ahead," *Newsweek*, 19 February 2001, 32.

<sup>13</sup> Frank Gaffney, "Bush, Missile Defense, and the Critics," *Commentary*, February 2001, 29.

<sup>14</sup> Hosenball and Thomas, "Danger," 35.

<sup>15</sup> Gaffney, "Missile Defense," 35.

<sup>16</sup> U.S. President, *National Security Strategy*, 29.

<sup>17</sup> National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future with Nongovernment Experts*. Available at [http:// www.cia.gov/cia/publications/globaltrends2015](http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/globaltrends2015), 6-7.

<sup>18</sup> Institute for National Strategic Studies, *Strategic Assessment 1999* (Fort McNair: National Defense University Press, 1999), 16.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 17.

<sup>21</sup> Joel Krieger et. al, eds., *The Oxford Companion the Politics of the World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 884.

<sup>22</sup> John M. Collins. *Grand Strategy: Practices and Principles* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 193), 14.

<sup>23</sup> Drew and Snow, *Making Strategy*, 16.

<sup>24</sup> Bartlett, Holman, and Sones, "Strategy and Force Planning," 20.

<sup>25</sup> Conrad Crane, reporting author, *Alternative National Military Strategies for the United States* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute Conference Report, December 2000), 11.

<sup>26</sup> Richmond Lloyd, "Strategy and Force Planning Framework," in *Strategy and Force Planning*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, eds. Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, Naval War College (Newport: Naval War College Press, 2000), 3.

<sup>27</sup> U.S. President, *National Security Strategy*, 1-2.

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<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 4.

<sup>29</sup> Collins, *Grand Strategy*, 7.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., iii.

<sup>31</sup> Ronald W. Moore, "Resourcing the Force: The Legacy of Cold War Strategy." *Joint Force Quarterly* (Summer 2000): 123.

<sup>32</sup> One could argue that the shortcomings of the current *National Security Strategy* are not entirely due to a failure of vision, but are also partially the result of the internal political process and bureaucratic trade-offs inherent in creating a product that cuts across so many departmental boundaries. Although beyond the scope of this monograph, it should be acknowledged that any improvement in the *National Security Strategy* will likely be limited somewhat by the process through which grand strategy is created in a representative democracy. However, adopting a more focused and coherent approach to the creation of grand strategy as outlined in this monograph will most assuredly mitigate much of the "watering-down" that has doomed previous post-Cold War strategies to mediocrity.

<sup>33</sup> Collins, *Grand Strategy*, 1.

<sup>34</sup> Robert J. Art, "Geopolitics Updated: The Strategy of Selective Engagement," in *Strategy and Force Planning*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, eds. Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, Naval War College (Newport: Naval War College Press, 2000), 187.

<sup>35</sup> Drew and Snow, *Making Strategy*, 14.

<sup>36</sup> Daniel J. Kaufman, David S. Clark, and Kevin P. Sheehan. *US National Security Strategy for the 1990s* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 3.

<sup>37</sup> U.S. Commission on National Security, *Phase II Report*, 6.

<sup>38</sup> Donald Neuchterlein. *America Recommitted: United States National Interests in a Restructured World* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1991), 17.

<sup>39</sup> National Defense Panel, *Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. Available from <http://www.dtic.mil/ndp>, 19.

<sup>40</sup> National Defense Panel, *Transforming Defense*, 19-20.

<sup>41</sup> U.S. Commission on National Security, *Phase II Report*, 7.

<sup>42</sup> Collins, *Grand Strategy*, 1.

<sup>43</sup> Hubert P. Van Tuyl. *America's Strategic Future: A Blueprint for National Survival in the New Millennium* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1998), 115.

<sup>44</sup> U.S. Commission on National Security, *Phase I Report*, 5.

<sup>45</sup> Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, sec. 603 (1986).

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<sup>46</sup> National Defense Panel, *Transforming Defense*, 20-21.

<sup>47</sup> Neuchterlein, *America Recommitted*, 18.

<sup>48</sup> For an excellent examination of these three perspectives, see James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. *Contenting Theories of International Relations*, 4<sup>th</sup> edition. (New York: Longman, 1996), 144-177.

<sup>49</sup> For a discussion of the regional divisions in the current national security strategy, see U.S. President, *National Security Strategy*, 29-47. For a discussion of the current areas of responsibility for the regional commanders in Chief under the latest *Unified Command Plan*, see “Unified Command Plan Changes,” available at <http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/unified/planchanges1.html>.

<sup>50</sup> Institute for National Strategic Studies, *Strategic Assessment*, ix and 69-169, and National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2015*, 26-32.

<sup>51</sup> Samuel P. Huntington. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 13.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, 28.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 26-27, and 45.

<sup>54</sup> U.S. Department of State, “State Department: What We Do,” Available at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/rem/biocrm/index.cfm>.

<sup>55</sup> Office of the United States Trade Representative, “World Regions,” Available at <http://www.ustr.gov/regions/index.shtml>.

<sup>56</sup> Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*, 20.

<sup>57</sup> Grant T. Hammond, “Time for a Revolution: The Transformation from National Defense to International Security,” in *Organizing for National Security*, ed. Douglas T. Stuart (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2000), 190-191.143.

<sup>58</sup> Barry R. Posen and Andrew Ross, “Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy,” in *Strategy and Force Planning*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, eds. Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, Naval War College (Newport: Naval War College Press, 2000), 137.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, 139.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, 141.

<sup>61</sup> The actual passage from *Animal Farm* refers to the single commandment scrawled on the barn wall after the pigs had assumed tyrannical control of the farm, “All animals equal. But some animals are more equal than others.” See George Orwell. *Animal Farm* (New York: Harcourt-Brace, 1946), 123. My apologies to the late Mr. Orwell.

<sup>62</sup> Posen and Ross, “Competing Visions,” 146-147.



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- <sup>63</sup> Ibid., 149.
- <sup>64</sup> Thomas Friedman. *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (New York: Anchor Books, 1999), 8.
- <sup>65</sup> Posen and Ross, “Competing Visions,” 152.
- <sup>66</sup> Ibid., 152-153.
- <sup>67</sup> Ibid., 151.
- <sup>68</sup> Ibid., 155.
- <sup>69</sup> Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment.” *Foreign Affairs* (1990/91): 33.
- <sup>70</sup> Posen and Ross, “Competing Visions,” 155.
- <sup>71</sup> Ibid., 156, 160.
- <sup>72</sup> National Defense Panel, *Transforming Defense*, vii.
- <sup>73</sup> U.S. Commission on National Security, *Phase I Report*, 7.
- <sup>74</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *MCDP 1-1 Strategy*. (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1997), 50.
- <sup>75</sup> Collins, *Grand Strategy*, 5.
- <sup>76</sup> Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process*, 5<sup>th</sup> edition. (New York: St. Martin’s, 1996), 154.
- <sup>77</sup> Joint Publication 1-02, *The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. Available at [www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel.html](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel.html).
- <sup>78</sup> Bartlett, Holman, and Simes, “Strategy and Force Planning,” 21.
- <sup>79</sup> Institute for National Strategic Studies, *Strategic Assessment*, 89-95, and National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2015*, 28-29.
- <sup>80</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>81</sup> National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2015*, 23.
- <sup>82</sup> Institute for National Strategic Studies, *Strategic Assessment*, 95.
- <sup>83</sup> Institute for National Strategic Studies, *Strategic Assessment*, 155.
- <sup>84</sup> Ibid., 157-162.
- <sup>85</sup> National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2015*, 30.

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<sup>86</sup> Institute for National Strategic Studies, *Strategic Assessment*, 167.

<sup>87</sup> National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2015*, 30.

<sup>88</sup> Institute for National Strategic Studies, *Strategic Assessment*, 165.

<sup>89</sup> The statutory members of the National Security Council are the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. Each president also has the latitude to include others in this body as he sees fit.

<sup>90</sup> Marcella, "National Security and the Interagency Process," 170, and Gregory T. Foster. *In Search of a Post-Cold War Security Structure*. McNair Paper 27. (Fort McNair: National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1994), 19.

<sup>91</sup> There are numerous in-depth examinations available of the National Security Act and its implications. A fairly good summary of the events leading up to the passage of the Act, and especially its implications on the military and the making of grand strategy, can be found in Chapter 5 of Thomas D. Boettcher. *First Call: The Making of the Modern US Military, 1945-1953*. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1996).

<sup>92</sup> Several authors refer to this fact as a systemic failure in creating national security strategies to keep pace with the changing international environment. See Hammond, "Time for a Revolution," 138-139; Foster, "In Search of," 14-15; National Defense Panel, *Transforming Defense*, 60; and U.S. Commission on National Security, *Phase III Report*, 47.

<sup>93</sup> Institute for National Strategic Studies, *Strategic Assessment*, xix.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, 48.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, 52.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, 54. The Commission's report follows the job description of these new regional Under Secretaries with the wry observation, "Someone would actually be in charge." It should also be noted that for all its perspicacity, the Commission established its regions of the world according to the relatively unimaginative geographic approach discussed in Chapter two of this monograph.

<sup>97</sup> Going one step farther than simply reorganizing the State Department, creating the institutions to develop and advance a more comprehensive national security strategy could logically include the realignment of all the other agencies involved in national security including a realignment of the geographic areas of responsibility of the warfighting Commanders in Chief as well.

<sup>98</sup> Metz, "Why Aren't Americans Better at Strategy?," 187.

<sup>99</sup> Robert Jervis, "US Grand Strategy: Mission Impossible." *Naval War College Review* (Summer 1998): 23.

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<sup>100</sup> Unfortunately, many of these criticisms spring from domestic partisan politics rather than a dispassionate and scholarly examination of national security strategy. It is difficult to find an article written by a Democratic-leaning writer who has anything critical to say of the Clinton administration's national security strategies, and equally difficult to find a Republican-leaning writer who says anything positive. This is to be expected in the run-up to a presidential election, where aspiring cabinet members and administration officials want to be published in academic journals. However, it also represents a larger trend in the study of foreign policy. The (bipartisan) Hart-Rudman Commission has this to say on the subject; "...foreign policy is also now very politicized. Few, if any, issues are easily separated from domestic political debate: not military intervention, not diplomatic relations, and certainly not trade and economic relations with the outside world." See U.S. Commission on National Security, *Phase III Report*, 50.

<sup>101</sup> William G. Hyland, "A Mediocre Record." *Foreign Policy* (Winter 1995-96): 73.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, 74.

<sup>103</sup> Condoleeza Rice, "Promoting the National Interest." *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 2000): 46.

<sup>104</sup> Jervis, "Mission Impossible," 33.

<sup>105</sup> Rice, "Promoting the National Interest," 46.

<sup>106</sup> General Henry H. Shelton, "Force, Forces, and Forecasting," Speech to the National Press Club, 14 December 2000. *Vital Speeches of the Day* (15 January 2001): 195.

<sup>107</sup> *Kansas City Star*, 15 February 2001.

<sup>108</sup> Metz. "Why Aren't Americans Better at Strategy?," 188.

<sup>109</sup> Jervis, "Mission Impossible," 26.

<sup>110</sup> Institute for National Strategic Studies, *Strategic Assessment*, 259; U.S. Commission on National Security, *Phase I Report*, 8; National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2015*, 9; and U.S. President, *National Security Strategy*, 2.

<sup>111</sup> Charles W. Freeman, Jr. *The Diplomat's Dictionary* (Fort McNair: National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1996), 366.

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